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Recent scientific developments that have dramatically increased the
value of human tissue are raising unprecedented issues with respect to
commercial property rights in the human body. These issues have led one
court to recognize explicitly a person's commercial interest in his bodily
tissue.' The ramifications of this decision in the area of fetal tissue re-
search2 are considerable, given the substantial research value of fetal tis-
sue and the profound ethical issues associated with abortion. The decision,
by lending support to the proposition that a woman may assert a commer-
cial interest in her fetal tissue, critically underscores the imperative of ef-
fective laws to prevent the commercial exploitation of abortion.
The commercial value of fetal tissue stems from its unique and highly
beneficial properties in medical research.3 The primary applications of fe-
1. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988);
see also infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. For a scholarly examination of how traditional
property doctrine may be applied to find a commercial interest in bodily tissues, see generally Note,
Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of
Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986).
2. Fetal tissue research uses samples of tissue taken from fetuses deceased as a result of spontane-
ous or induced abortions. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, SUMMARY: FETAL RE-
SEARCH AND FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH 9 (1988).
3. "[Iln preventive medicine ... there is generally no practical substitute for the fetal tissues
used. This is especially the case in the field of virology .. . [In this field] it seems probable that the
use of fetal tissues will offer the only chance for growing the viruses thought to cause hepatitis and
infantile gastroenteritis." DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, SCOTTISH HOME AND
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, THE USE OF FETUSES AND FETAL MATERIAL FOR RESEARCH: REPORT OF
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tal tissue research are in therapeutic transplants of fetal tissue" and the
development of cell lines.5 Fetal tissue research may also enhance under-
standing of growth regulation as it relates to cancer and to the aging pro-
cess, and will be important in preventing and treating genetic disease.6
Offsetting the vast scientific benefits of fetal tissue research, however, is
the ethical risk that the increased demand for fetal tissue might promote
abortions for profit. Assuming that women have alienable property inter-
ests in their fetal tissue, the introduction of pecuniary inducements to pro-
cure such tissue might cause some women to abort their fetuses rather
than carry them to term.7
Although the scientific community and legislators have made piecemeal
efforts to address the ethical concerns stemming from the possible sale of
fetal tissue, the current regulatory regime still leaves several loopholes
through which abortions for profit might occur. In addition to the possi-
bility of selling fetal tissue outright to clinics and research establishments
that perform abortions but are not subject to restrictive regulations,
women who donate fetal tissue for research may have an interest in any
commercial developments stemming from that research." Women may
thus be able to obtain immediate payment for their fetuses and/or con-
tractual agreements guaranteeing them royalties from any profits derived
from eventual commercial applications of the research.
Part I of this Note examines existing law that recognizes in individuals
property rights in their bodily tissues, and explores how this law pertains
to the fetus. It argues that juridically, the status of the fetus is indistin-
guishable from that of other bodily tissues. It then discusses, and points
out the limitations of, existing federal and state regulations and other ini-
THE ADVISORY GROUP 2-3 (1972), reprinted in NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, APPENDIX TO REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETus, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-128, at 19-3 (1975) [herein-
after APPENDIX].
4. Fetal tissue is amenable to transplantation because it grows rapidly in the adult body yet tends
not to be rejected by the immune system. Scientists have been investigating the use of fetal tissue
transplants in the treatment of a wide range of conditions, including: Diabetes, Parkinson's Disease,
and blood diseases such as sickle cell anemia, thalassemia and severe combined immunodeficiency.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, supra note 2, at 10-11.
5. Id. at 9. A cell line is a sample of cells that has undergone the process of adaptation to artificial
laboratory cultivation and is capable of sustaining continuous, indefinite growth in culture. "Cell lines
prepared from human tissues are essential for the reproduction of human viruses both for the diagno-
sis of disease and in the production of human vaccines." Id. Cell lines from fetal tissue possessing rare
genetic traits may also be cultivated for use in the manufacture of therapeutic drugs.
6. APPENDIX, supra note 3, at 1-35.
7. The offering of financial consideration for fetal tissues was documented in a 1977 report by the
London Times. The article reported the sale by a South Korean medical practitioner of thousands of
pairs of fetal kidneys to an American medical supply corporation. According to the report, the kid-
neys, which were in great demand as a medium for developing cultures, were resold in the United
States to research laboratories conducting research aimed at producing antiviral vaccines. The report
also mentioned that fetal material was being provided by approximately 250 sources in twelve coun-
tries. The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1977, at 10, col. 1.




tiatives that attempt to prohibit the sale of fetuses and fetal tissue. Part II
presents a legal argument, derived from general principles of property
law, that women might use to assert a commercial property interest in
their fetuses. Part III argues that judicial recognition of a commercial
property interest in fetal tissue would be contrary to public policy, and
Part IV concludes by proposing legislation that would provide a more ef-
fective bar against the exploitation of commercial property interests in fe-
tal tissue for private profit.
I. THE STATUS OF THE FETUS IN PROPERTY LAW
At least one court has recognized that, in the absence of restrictive legisla-
tion, a person has both a possessory and a commercial interest in her bod-
ily tissues.9 Restrictive legislation-whether enacted in the form of direct
prohibitions of sales or in the form of limitations of rights incidental to
property interests-is not uncommon and reflects the belief that public
policy concerns sometimes outweigh the benefits of unfettered property
rights. Donors of human organs for transplant, for example, must comply
with legislation prohibiting the offer or receipt of any financial considera-
tion for organ transfers.10 The policy rationale behind these prohibitions
stems from the paternalistic view that impoverished individuals might be
induced to sell their organs for profit. Unlike donations of blood, which
rarely cause adverse health effects since blood is replenishable, the re-
moval of certain organs may be detrimental to human health. Legislators
have perceived these public health risks as outweighing the value of an
individual's unfettered right to sell his bodily organs. The policy argument
for prohibiting the sale of fetal tissue-prevention of abortion for
profit-is similarly viewed as outweighing unfettered property rights.
However, although several policy-making institutions have addressed the
issue of fetal tissue sales, the regulatory framework surrounding such sales
has been very weak." Assuming that judicial decisions recognizing a
property interest in human bodily tissue can be extended to include fe-
tuses, and that women consequently can exploit this commercial property
interest, the absence of effective legislative restrictions may allow the spec-
ter of abortions for profit to become a reality.
9. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1244-52, 249 Cal. Rptr.
494, 503-09 (1988) (court acknowledged "giving patients a financial interest in their tissues").
10. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of arguments in favor of
paying donors or their estates in order to increase the supply of organs available for transplant, see
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL SrUD. 103, 138-39 (1979); Note,
The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1216-20 (1974); Trucco, Sales of Kidneys
Prompt New Laws and Debate, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at Cl, col. 1.
11. See infra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
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A. The Juridical Status of the Fetus: The Absence of Legal Distinctions
Between Fetal and Other Bodily Tissue
A uniform and absolute legal distinction between fetal and other bodily
tissues does not presently exist.' 2 If such a distinction did exist, and the
fetus were juridically recognized as a person, the law vesting in individu-
als a commercial interest in their bodily tissues would clearly not pertain
to a woman's interest in her fetus. Sales of fetal tissue, in such a case,
would fall within the jurisdiction of laws prohibiting the sale of babies.
This section will demonstrate, however, that sweeping judicial precedent
has not been established to accord fetal tissue a status distinct from any
other bodily tissues.
The earliest and most frequently cited case discussing the legal status of
the fetus, Dietrich v. Northampton,'3 held that a child en ventre sa mere
(in the womb of its mother) is an integral part of its mother, with no
separate juridical existence, and therefore is not entitled to sue through an
administrator for injuries causing its death. Although Dietrich was widely
followed for many years, the interpretive trend since 1946 has been to
exclude viable fetuses from its holding. Thus, injuries to viable 4 fetuses
are generally held compensable in tort actions brought after birth, 5 and
injuries to viable fetuses leading to death are generally remediable by a
wrongful death action brought by the fetus' personal representative.' 6
Many courts have also extended rights of recovery to pre-viable fetuses.
12. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), the Supreme Court was
asked to rule on the constitutionality of the preamble, inter alia, to a Missouri statute regulating the
performance of abortions. The preamble contained "findings" by the state legislature that "[t]he life of
each human being begins at conception," and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being." Id. at 3049 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.1(1),(2) (1986)). The Court,
however, declined to rule on the constitutionality of the preamble on the grounds that it was merely
an abstract proposition that as yet had not been applied. Id. at 3050.
13. 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (no right of action can accrue to unborn fetus).
14. A viable fetus is one potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artifical
aid. Although viability is now generally thought to occur at about the twenty-fourth week of preg-
nancy, new developments in medical research presage the advancement of viability to a much earlier
stage of pregnancy. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Kolata, Survival of the Fetus: A Barrier is Reached, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 18, 1989, at Cl, col. 4.
15. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 368-74, 56 N.E. 638, 640-42 (1900) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (case frequently cited for well-reasoned dissenting opinion that child has right of action for
injuries suffered in utero after point of viability); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412
(1953) (overruling Allaire); see also Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141-42 (D.D.C. 1946) (first
case recognizing cause of action by child for injuries suffered in utero after viability).
16. See, e.g., Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (under state's wrong-
ful death statute, right of action found to exist for stillborn fetus that had attained developmental stage
of viability). Cases finding a cause of action in wrongful death for a viable fetus often hinge on
statutory interpretation of the word "person" as used in wrongful death statutes, rather than whether
the fetus is a person in the philosophical, theological or scientific sense. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace,
120 N.H. 675, 678, 421 A.2d 134, 136 (1980) ("Regardless of the philosophical, theological or medi-
cal theories of when life begins, we are dealing here with legal causes of action created by legislative
act. . . ."); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 192-93, 365 A.2d 748, 756 (1976) (construing
meaning of "person" in wrongful death statute to include stillborn viable fetus).
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These rights, however, generally appear to be contingent upon live birth"7
and as such reflect nothing more than a public policy interest in postnatal
life. 8 Moreover, the cases discussing the termination of fetal rights at pre-
natal death specifically declare that a pre-viable fetus after its death no
longer has recognizable legal rights independent of its mother. 9 From this
suggestion, one may infer that a legally aborted pre-viable fetus is legally
indistinguishable from any surgically removed bodily tissues.20 This is not
to say that a pre-viable fetus is not distinguishable from other bodily tis-
sues in other respects, whether biological, theological or philosophical; but
rather, that from a legal perspective, once a pre-viable fetus is dead, it
possesses no rights and is not recognized by the courts as a juridical en-
tity. 1 The case law allowing recovery where injuries are sustained and
17. See Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 635 (La. 1981) ("From the moment of conception, a
child is considered in law as if it had already been born, and is entitled to certain rights and privi-
leges. However, this reputed legal personality is conditioned upon the child's live birth; if the child is
not born alive, the effects of its fictional legal personality are considered never to have existed.")
(interpreting legislative pronouncement that human being exists from moment of fertilization and
implantation); Wascom v. American Indem. Corp., 348 So. 2d 128, 130 (La. App. 1977) ("Children
born dead are considered as if they had never been born or conceived.") (quoting LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 28 (West 1952)); Youman v. McConnell & McConnell, Inc., 7 La. App. 315, 317 (1927)
(child born dead never acquired "a legal personality distinct from its mother"); Wallace v. Wallace,
120 N.H. 675, 677, 421 A.2d 134, 135 (1980) ("[A]t common law, the existence of a child en ventre
sa mere was recognized for some purposes .... [However,] [aill such rights terminated if the fetus
aborted or was stillborn."); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1969) ("[E]ven if, as science and theology teach, the child begins a separate 'life'
from the moment of conception, it is clear that ... the law has never considered the unborn foetus as
having a separate 'juridical existence' . . . or a legal personality or identity 'until it sees the light of
day'"); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 197, 365 A.2d 748, 758 (1976) (Kelleher, J., dis-
senting) (although fetus in utero considered life in being for purpose of inheritance and fetus to some
extent protected by the criminal laws, once stillborn, it loses those rights; universally recognized that
enjoyment of rights of unborn contingent on being born alive); West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 375,
105 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1958) ("The policy considerations which call for a right of action when a child
survives do not necessarily apply in absence of survival."); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 243,
319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958) ("[T]hat life begins at the moment of conception, and that it is such a
vital organism as to be at once a person in esse ... is a pure fiction of the law .... [The fetus] is a
part of its own mother's physical body.").
18. Courts have extended recovery rights to pre-viable fetuses largely in recognition of the right to
begin life unimpaired, regardless of the stage of development at which a cause of impairment might
occur. As one commentator has explained, "[t~he lack of a 'person' in being to whom the duty of care
may be owed has often troubled courts, though it should not in cases where the child is later born
alive and suffers after birth the results of the injury." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1029 (1956). Similar considerations govern the rights of a pre-viable fetus to inherit subject to
survival. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
19. See supra cases cited at note 17.
20. However, one court that specifically declined to comment on the fetus' "personhood," either in
the philosophical or scientific sense, held "as a matter of law, that a fetus is not relegated to the status
of chattel." Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987). But see
id. at 509 n.1 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting) ("The court leaves us in a vacuum as how to identify a
fetus.").
21. "As a general rule, an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child will not lie where the
child had not sufficiently developed in its mother's body so that it could have lived apart from its
mother at the time of injury." 62 AM. JuR. 2D Prenatal Injuries § 17 (1972). But see Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 716, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955) (action permitted where fetus not viable
but "quick," that is, capable of moving or stirring in its mother's womb). In a minority of states,
courts will not grant a wrongful death action for either a viable or a nonviable fetus, due to their
interpretation of "person" in wrongful death statutes.
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the fetus is consequently killed embraces this view: "the law focuses on
the existence of the fetus as a physical part of the pregnant woman by
emphasizing that compensation is being granted for injury incurred by the
woman" 22 rather than by the fetus.
Based on the foregoing, courts in some jurisdictions could reasonably
conclude that there exists no legal distinction between a pre-viable aborted
fetus and other tissues removed from a person's body. In such jurisdic-
tions, the common law recognizing or conferring on individuals a commer-
cial property interest in their bodily tissues would presumably encompass
fetal tissue as well.
B. The Regulatory Status of the Fetus
1. Federal Initiatives
The unresolved issue of whether a fetus is a separate person or a part
of its mother's bodily tissue, together with vigorous protest over the possi-
ble legality of fetal tissue sales," has prompted reactions in both the exec-
utive and legislative branches of the Federal Government.24 In 1974, Con-
gress created the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("Commission"), man-
dated to "investigat[e] and study . . . research involving living fetuses,
[and] . . . recommend . . . policies defining the circumstances (if any)
under which such research may be conducted or supported. '25 The Com-
mission's recommendations formed the basis for federal regulations en-
acted in 1975 which, inter alia, state that "[n]o inducements, monetary or
otherwise, may be offered to terminate pregnancy for purposes of . . .
[research] activity."26 The regulations, however, are limited in that they
explicitly govern only research funded by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).2" Furthermore, the regulations do not expressly
22. Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her Fetus-Is This a
Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 807, 815 (1987).
23. Much of this concern was precipitated by the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and the expectation that an abundance of fetuses would thereafter become vulnerable
to exploitation and commercialization.
24. A great deal of scholarly commentary has also been written on the subject. See, e.g., Baron,
Legislative Regulation of Fetal Experimentation: On Negotiating Compromise in Situations of Ethi-
cal Pluralism, in GENETICS AND THE LAW III, at 431 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1984);
Mahowald, Silver & Ratcheson, The Ethical Options in Transplanting Fetal Tissue, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 9 (Feb. 1987).
25. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 348, 350 (1974).
26. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(b) (1988).
27. Despite this explicit limitation, the federal regulations effectively cover all federally funded
institutions, regardless of the source of the funds the institution may be using specifically for fetal
research. See Baron, supra note 24, at 432-33. But see CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE TO THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 2 REPORT OF THE HUMAN FETAL
TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH PANEL, at D69 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter RESEARCH PANEL
REPORT] (testimony of Arthur L. Caplan, Director of Center for Biomedical Ethics at University of
Minnesota) ("A large proportion of the fetal tissues currently being used in research are procured by
individual researchers through private arrangements they have made with obstetricians or abortion
[Vol. 99: 169
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prohibit sales of fetal tissue and defer completely to state and local laws
whenever research involves a deceased fetus or its tissue.2"
More recently, public concern over the ethical implications of fetal tis-
sue research and experimentation has increased, and the adequacy of ex-
isting regulations has been questioned. One observer has suggested that
the increased public concern is due to:
fears that the demand from potential transplant recipients, possibly
numbering in the millions, will be so urgent that human fetuses will
be conceived and intentionally aborted so that their organs and tis-
sues can be harvested for transplantation. . . . A more meaningful
ethical concern regarding fetal tissue transplantations has to do with
whether their therapeutic benefits would lend an implicit legitimacy
to abortion that it does not now have.
Increased public concern over the ethical implications of fetal tissue re-
search manifested itself in March, 1988, when HHS imposed a morato-
rium on the use by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of human
fetal tissue obtained from induced abortions for therapeutic transplanta-
tions. 0 In addition, in September, 1988, the White House issued a draft
executive order that sought to proscribe research and experimentation in-
volving fetuses from induced abortions and "to prohibit the commercial
use or sale of an unborn . . . child's body, organ or tissue.13 1 Such an
executive order, by its terms, would have affected all federal agencies and
departments, facilities receiving federal funding, and facilities governed by
federal law,32 had it taken effect.
Notwithstanding these efforts to curtail fetal tissue research, an expert
panel convened under the auspices of NIH to examine the ethical, legal,
and scientific issues of using human fetal tissue from induced abortions for
research and therapy recommended continued utilization of fetal tissue.
The panel stated in its draft recommendations to an NIH advisory com-
mittee that the use of fetal tissue from a legal, induced abortion "is accept-
able public policy" because the research is aimed at significant medical
clinics.").
28. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1988) ("Activities involving the dead fetus, mascerated fetal material, or
cells, tissue, or organs excised from a dead fetus shall be conducted only in accordance with any
applicable State or local laws regarding such activities.").
29. RESEARCH PANEL REPORT, supra note 27, at E22-23 (testimony of Myron Genel, Associate
Dean for Government and Community Affairs, Yale University School of Medicine (representing the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Association of American Universities
(AAU))).
30. See Federal Agency Bars Implanting of Fetal Tissue, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
A recent report suggests that the Bush Administration plans to extend this moratorium. See Abortion
Debate Clouds Research on Fetal Tissue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
31. Exec. Order Draft, §§ 4-5 (enclosure with letter from Gary Bauer, Assistant to President for
Policy and Development, to Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of HHS, Sept. 2, 1988) (on file with author).
32. Id. at § 6.
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goals."3 The panel nonetheless acknowledged "the moral convictions
deeply held in our society" 4 and concluded that "appropriate guidelines
are required even as the research proceeds."3 "
The draft recommendations of the panel, which were adopted by the
advisory committee and proposed to NIH ("proposed guidelines"), at-
tempt to balance the benefits of medical advancement against the risk of
encouraging abortion by ensuring that abortion decisions not be predicated
upon or induced by any information pertaining to the possible use of the
fetus in medical research. The proposed guidelines, moreover, specifically
embody the premise that the abortion decision should not be based on any
financial inducement and, therefore, that no payments should be given to
procure fetal tissue.3" The Yale-New Haven Medical Center has already
adopted these guidelines in a research protocol.3 ' The Stanford University
Medical Center Committee on Ethics has also concluded that, subject to
certain conditions, ethical considerations allow the appropriate medical
use of human fetal tissue.3 "
Congress, for its part, has acted to minimize the ethical risks of fetal
tissue research and experimentation by passing a recent amendment to the
National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).3 9 The amendment extends the
provisions of the Act, which regulates organ transfer and prohibits the
sale in interstate commerce of organs for transplant, to include specifically
fetuses, fetal organs, and fetal tissues. The Act, however, limits the prohi-
bition of fetal tissue sales to transactions involving transplants, and there-
fore does not reach the possibility of selling fetal tissue for the purpose of
generalized research or for the commercial development of derivative
products.40
33. 1 RESEARCH PANEL REPORT, supra note 27, at 1; see also Panel Again Backs Research With
Tissue of Aborted Fetuses, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1988, at 9, col. 2.
34. 1 RESEARCH PANEL REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, PROTOCOL FOR
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (Apr. 18, 1988) [hereinafter PROTOCOL] (on file with au-
thor). Under the Yale Protocol, women are not made aware of the possibility of being invited to
participate in research until all arrangements for the abortion procedure, including the obtaining of
informed consent, have been accomplished. The Protocol, moreover, states explicitly that there shall be
no economic consideration for donors of fetal tissue. See infra note 54.
38. Special Report, The Ethical Use of Human Fetal Tissue in Medicine, 320 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1093 (1989). The report argues, as does this Note, for an expansion of legal constraints on the
commercialization of fetal tissue.
39. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984), amended by Title IV-Organ Transplant Amend-
ments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3116 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 273-274e (West Supp. 1989)).
40. Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301(a), 98 Stat. 2339, 2346 (1984) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable considera-
tion for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce."), amended by Title
IV-Organ Transplant Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 407, 102 Stat. 3116 (1988)
("The term 'human organ' means the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas,
bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any
subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and Human
[Vol. 99: 169
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2. State Legislation
Various state statutes supplement the federal legislation governing fetal
tissue sales. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA),4' which governs gifts of tissues
and organs for research or therapeutic transplants. The scope of UAGA,
which was promulgated in 1968, reaches the procurement and use of tis-
sue from deceased fetuses.4 2 The Act permits fetal tissue to be donated for
research purposes if either parent grants permission and the other does
not object.4 While twenty-five states rely exclusively, with respect to re-
search on deceased fetuses, on the enabling provisions of UAGA,44 the
remainder have specific statutes supplementing or preempting UAGA. Al-
though some of these statutes expressly prohibit nontherapeutic research
on deceased fetuses, 5 the vast majority of regulating states permit it.46
The 1968 version of UAGA did not directly address the issue of selling
bodily parts. However, a more recent version of the Act prohibits
purchases and sales of bodily parts for valuable consideration where re-
moval of the part is intended to occur after the death of the decedent.
47
Although this provision appears to encompass sales of fetal tissue, it has,
like NOTA, been narrowly drawn and applies only to transactions of
bodily parts for transplantation or therapy, as opposed to generalized re-
Services by regulation.").
41. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gir ACT, 8A U.L.A. 30 (1983).
42. "'Decedent' means a deceased individual and includes a stillborn infant or fetus." Id. at §
I(b).
43. Id. at §§ 2(b)-(c).
44. See Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12 (Apr.
1985).
45. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302.A (1986):
A person shall not knowingly use any human fetus or embryo, living or dead, or any parts,
organs or fluids of any such fetus or embryo resulting from an induced abortion in any manner
for any medical experimentation or scientific or medical investigation purposes except as is
strictly necessary to diagnose a disease or condition in the mother of the fetus or embryo and
only if the abortion was performed because of such disease or condition.
See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Bums 1985) (prohibiting experimentation other than patho-
logical examinations on aborted fetus); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1987) (prohibit-
ing experimentation upon or sale of "the product of human conception which is aborted."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735.B (West 1984) (prohibiting experimentation "upon the remains of a child
or an unborn child resulting from an abortion.").
46. Baron, supra note 44, at 14-15. Twenty-five states have no regulations governing fetal tissue
research other than the enabling provisions of UAGA. Among the regulating states, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
and Wyoming permit research on deceased fetuses. The only states not permitting nontherapeutic
research on deceased fetuses are: Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
47. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIrT ACT (1987) § 10, 8A U.L.A. (Supp. 1989). California, Connecti-
cut, and Hawaii have repealed the 1968 version of UAGA and have enacted instead the 1987 version.
Connecticut, however, has not adopted the relevant section and only prohibits the acquisition, receipt,
or other transfer for valuable consideration of human organs for use in human transplantation. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280a (West Supp. 1989). Hawaii has adopted the relevant section
without modification, see HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-10 (1988), while California has adopted and
expanded the relevant part, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155 (West Supp. 1989).
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search or product development.48 As for individual state statutes, most
contain no express prohibitions against sales of fetal tissue.4
The uncertain juridical status of the fetus, coupled with a regulatory
framework that has not anticipated the potential for commercial trade in
fetal tissue, has created an environment conducive to the commercial ex-
ploitation of fetal tissue. The following section demonstrates that current
case law, which explicitly acknowledges an individual's property right in
her bodily tissue, could be extended to the fetus unless courts clearly dis-
tinguish the fetus from other bodily tissues, or restrictive legislation is
promulgated expressly prohibiting the free exercise of commercial prop-
erty rights in fetal tissue.
II. THE EMERGING PROPERTY RIGHT IN FETAL TISSUE
As discussed in Part I, existing federal rules governing fetal tissue re-
search contain inadequate restrictions on sales and, moreover, govern only
federally funded research establishments. Of the additional sources of law
governing fetal tissue sales, NOTA applies only in the narrow context of
transplantation and the 1987 version of UAGA, which has been adopted
in relevant part by only two states, applies only in the context of trans-
plantation or therapy. The law therefore leaves open the potential for ex-
ploitation of commercial property rights in fetal tissue and the develop-
ment of a market in such tissue. These gaps in the existing regulatory
framework have assumed new significance in light of a recent decision,
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,5" by a California court
of appeal.
A. The Moore Opinion
Moore held that a person possesses a commercial property interest in
his bodily tissue.5" The case arose when a patient, who had been hospital-
48. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 10, 8A U.L.A. (Supp. 1989). But see CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 7155 (West Supp. 1989) (expanding relevant section to prohibit sales "for trans-
plantation, therapy, or reconditioning").
49. For examples of state Anatomical Gift Acts that do prohibit sales of fetal tissue, see ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 11, para. 308.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (any payment or offer of payment of any finan-
cial consideration to donor considered misdemeanor for first conviction and felony for subsequent
convictions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-11.A (Supp. 1988) ("No person may acquire, receive or other-
wise transfer for valuable consideration any human organ or tissue."); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
4307 (McKinney 1985) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or other-
wise transfer for valuable consideration any human organ for use in human transplantation."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (1985) ("With the exception of hair, blood and other self-replicating body
fluids, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, to offer to sell, to buy, to offer to buy or to procure
through purchase any natural body part for any reason including, but not limited to, medical and
scientific uses such as transplantation, implantation, infusion or injection.").
50. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, review granted, 763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr.
816 (1988).
51. The explicit holding in Moore was that the commercial exploitation of bodily tissues without
fully informed consent constitutes a conversion. In so holding, however, the court recognized by impli-
cation that people have a "financial interest in their tissues." See 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1252, 249 Cal.
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ized for a common surgical procedure, discovered that research scientists
had used his blood to develop a cell line from which profitable pharma-
ceutical products were manufactured. Although the patient had consented
to the use of his blood in research, he never expressly consented to any
commercial use of his blood. The court held that, absent express knowl-
edge and informed consent, such commercial rights could not be waived.52
Although the court did not determine how compensatory damages would
be valued, it ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to recover some share of
the profits derived from the commercial use of his bodily tissue.
In the absence of judicial authority establishing a legal distinction be-
tween fetal and other bodily tissues, the holding in Moore could be inter-
preted to include fetal tissue.53 Given the prohibition against donor com-
pensation embodied in the draft NIH guidelines for fetal tissue research,54
and Moore's requirement that waivers of donors' rights to compensation
for commercial exploitation of bodily tissue be explicit and predicated on
fully informed consent, institutions adhering to the NIH guidelines would
be required to change their informed consent procedures to fully reconcile
the NIH guidelines with Moore. These institutions would presumably re-
spond by amending consent forms55 to inform patients of possible com-
mercial applications of fetal tissue research and to obtain specific waivers
of any commercial rights attendant on such research."8 Consequently,
Rptr. at 509.
52. "If it should develop that plaintiff did expressly consent to what took place ... plaintiff will
have no basis for. . . [his] claim. . .. We conclude, however, that simple consent to surgery does not
imply a consent to . . . commercial exploitation of the patient's tissues." Id. at 1254, 249 Cal. Rptr.
at 510.
53. It is conceivable, however, that a court considering the application of the Moore doctrine to a
case involving fetal tissue might rely on the NIH guidelines as an indicator of public policy to distin-
guish fetal tissue from other bodily tissues. The Moore court stated that it "[had] been cited to no legal
authority, public policy, nor universally known facts of biological science concerning the particular
tissues referred to in th[e] pleading . . . which compel a conclusion that th[e] plaintiff cannot have a
sufficient legal interest in his own bodily tissues amounting to personal property." Id. at 1244, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 503-04. The NIH guidelines, however, despite their value as an indicator of federal
public policy, do not represent legal authority binding on courts. Thus, a court might be inclined, in
light of the persuasive authority which can be advanced in favor of a commercial property interest in
all human (including fetal) tissues, to follow Moore in the absence of statutory direction to the
contrary.
54. The Yale Protocol, for example, states in its present form that there shall be no economic
consideration for donors of fetal tissue and "[nlo commercialization, payments, or incentives to donate
the fetal tissue . . . ." PROTOCOL, supra note 37, app.G at 16. This stipulation appears to cover not
only direct payments but also contracts for a share of future profits derived from fetal tissue research.
55. Standard consent forms authorize hospitals to dispose of or preserve fetal tissue or other bodily
parts for diagnostic, scientific or teaching purposes, in accordance with medical practice. The Moore
holding "will require hospitals and surgeons to give prospective patients an expanded advisement
concerning potential research and commercial use of their removed bodily tissue and fluid or otherwise
risk foregoing such use or incurring potential liability." 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1266-67, 249 Cal. Rptr.
at 536 (George, J., dissenting).
56. However, regulations for the protection of human research subjects appear to prohibit all
waivers of subjects' legal rights. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1988) ("No informed consent, whether oral or
written, may include any exculpatory language through which the subject or the representative is
made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights . . . ."). This would presumably
include the right, recognized in Moore, to participate in profits from commercialization of bodily
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women seeking compensation, rather than altruistically donating their tis-
sue for research, would choose to avoid clinics and hospitals receiving
NIH or other federal funds and would seek out unregulated abortion clin-
ics that do not adhere to the guidelines. In such establishments, women
could receive direct compensation for use of their fetal tissue or could de-
mand contractual agreements with physicians or research scientists for
profit-sharing in the event that fetal tissue research should lead to com-
mercial applications.57 Although many potential donors of fetal tissue
might be willing to waive their rights to financial compensation, it is con-
ceivable that a significant number would opt for some form of remunera-
tion, thereby circumventing the policies embodied in the NIH guidelines.
B. Possessory Rights to Fetal Tissue: The Moore Analysis
The Moore court's determination that a person has a commercial prop-
erty interest in her bodily tissues stemmed from its recognition of a full
possessory right to such tissues. The court was not making the "legisla-
tive" decision whether the use of human tissue or body parts as raw mate-
rial for commercial developments should be limited to gifts or should be
subject only to the constraints of a free market.5" Rather, the court predi-
cated its decision that an individual has a commercial interest in his tis-
sues upon an individual's uncontroverted possessory interest in those tis-
sues. The court asserted that, given the degree of control that an
individual may exercise over his bodily tissues, the taking of such tissues
for commercial use without that person's fully informed consent consti-
tutes a conversion in the absence of a legislative ruling to the contrary.
Although the Moore court stated that it was neither called upon nor
was it attempting "to resolve the complex issues relating to the human
fetus,"59 its analysis, when applied to fetal tissue, strongly supports the
conclusion that women have similar legal protections against the conver-
sion of fetal tissue. In particular, in those jurisdictions where fetal tissue is
described as the possessory property of women carrying it and is vested
with the same characteristics of property as the tissue in Moore, it should
logically be subject to the same legal findings as the bodily tissue dealt
with in the Moore decision.
tissues. These regulations apply to research conducted or funded by HHS, and appear to be in direct
conflict with the NIH guidelines prohibiting donor compensation.
57. See Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Corn-
merdal Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 232 (1986) ("Recognition of the patient's
property rights ... requir[es] the physician to negotiate in advance or to engage in bargaining once
the commercial value of the patient's tissue becomes apparent.").
58. "We are not called on to determine whether use of human tissue or body parts ought to be
'gift based' or subject to a 'free market.'" 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1244, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504. The
primary example of a "gift based" statute is UAGA, which provides for "donations" of organs and
tissues from deceased persons and fetuses. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
59. 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1248 n.8, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.8.
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The Moore analysis is broad enough, moreover, to apply to fetal tissue.
The court used, as a starting point, the "broadest and most extensive"6
definition of property, stating that property is that collection of rights
amounting to the unrestricted "use, enjoyment and disposition" of an ob-
ject.6 ' Because property interests "are created, and their dimensions are
defined, by existing rules or understandings that stem from an indepen-
dent source such as state law,"62 any inquiry into the legal status of the
fetus and fetal tissue based on property rights must consider not only the
common law, but also the law embodied in state statutes governing the
various components of a property interest in the fetus. Given the defini-
tion of property relied on in Moore and accepted by legal scholars,63 prop-
erty interests established by state laws can be analyzed in two parts: the
right to use and enjoyment of an object, and the right of disposition of that
object.
1. Right to Use and Enjoyment
The right to the use and enjoyment of an object is an element essential
to a recognizable property interest. With respect to in utero fetuses, the
concept of use and enjoyment may be best understood in terms of the right
of women to autonomous choices of lifestyle, regardless of the impact that
those choices might have on their fetuses. This right has been recognized
in the context of prenatal abuse law. While courts in many states recog-
nize causes of action brought against third parties for injuries to pre-
viable fetuses subsequently born with defects," they almost uniformly re-
ject actions brought against women for prenatal abuse of their own fe-
tuses. To date, very few courts have allowed a child to recover against its
mother for negligent infliction of prenatal injuries.6 5 The special status of
women with respect to the treatment of their fetuses reflects an existing
recognition by courts that women possess an unfettered right to use and
enjoy their own bodily tissues, including that of their fetuses.
60. Id. at 1245, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (quoting 73 C.J.S. Property § 4, at 163-64 (1983)).
61. Id. at 1245, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504 ("As a matter of legal definition, 'property' refers not to a
particular material object but to the right and interest or domination rightfully obtained over such
object, with the unrestricted right to its use, enjoyment and disposition." (quoting 63A AM. JUR. 2D
Property § 1 (1984))).
62. 63A ANt. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (1984).
63. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 6 (2d ed. 1955) ("[T]he right of prop-
erty is . . . a collection or bundle of rights, of legally protected interests. The owner of a given piece
of land or chattel has not only the interest of possession, and of enjoyment and use[], but also that of
. . . directing how it shall be disposed of .... ") (emphasis added).
64. See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries § 5 (1972).
65. See e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980); see also Johnsen,
The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and
Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 605 (1986) ("The creation of fetal rights that can be used to the
detriment of pregnant women is a very recent phenomenon, and thus far has occurred in only a
relatively small number of cases."). However, at least one commentator predicts an increase in state
intervention on behalf of fetuses, both through coerced medical treatment of pregnant women and
through use of child custody provisions. See Johnsen, supra, at 605-09.
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2. Right of Disposition
In addition to the right to use and enjoyment, the right of disposition is
also necessary to constitute a full possessory property right as defined by
Moore."6 The right of disposition may itself be seen as comprised of two
essential parts: (1) the right to dispose of the fetus by abortion; and (2) the
right to determine whether or not the aborted fetus should be used for
research purposes.
The Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade17 implies a right of dis-
position until the end of the first trimester. Roe, though decided on the
basis of a constitutional right to privacy, 8 confers on the mother a de
facto property interest in her fetus until the point of viability with respect
to the right of abortion. More specifically, the Court in Roe, as subse-
quently modified by Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, held that
prior to the end of the first trimester, the state may not interfere at all in
the abortion decision, and subsequently, prior to viability, the state's regu-
lation of abortion is strictly limited to laws that are reasonably related to
the protection of maternal health. 9
With respect to the more specific right to determine the use of the fetus
in research, some states have conferred on women a statutory right to
make such determinations. In South Dakota, for example,
"[e]xperimentation with fetuses without written consent of the woman [is]
prohibited,"" ° and in Tennessee, "[i]t [is] unlawful for any person . . . to
engage in medical experiments, research, or the taking of photographs
upon an aborted fetus without the prior knowledge and consent of the
mother. 1 At least twenty-five additional states adhere without modifica-
tion to the UAGA guidelines which require the woman's consent.72 In
other states, however, statutes accord little or no importance to maternal
consent,"3 prohibiting research on fetuses and fetal tissue entirely, regard-
66. The ultimate disposition of the aborted fetus is subject to regulation by public health statutes.
However, "[significant limitations imposed by law on the disposition of a body after death reflect
public health concerns, rather than a legislative policy against a property interest ...." Moore, 202
Cal. App. 3d at 1247, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505. "[T]he absence of unlimited or unrestricted dominion
and control does not negate the existence of a property right for the purpose of a conversion action."
Id. at 1248-49, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. Id. at 153-54 ("This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. .... We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal
privacy includes the abortion decision ....").
69. Id. at 163. In Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), the Court somewhat relaxed the "rigid line"
demarcating viability, id. at 3057, and held constitutional a state statute that requires testing towards
the end of the second trimester (the twentieth week of pregnancy) to determine whether viability
already exists. Although the Court implied a willingness to reconsider further the trimester frame-
work in the future, it did not alter its jurisprudence with respect to the absolute right of abortion in
the first trimester.
70. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1986).
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982).
72. See Baron, supra note 44, at 14.
73. See id. But cf. RESEARCH PANEL REPORT, supra note 27, at D73 (testimony of Arthur L.
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less of the woman's wishes.7 4 The federal regulations defer to state and
local rules governing deceased fetuses and their tissues, although they do
require the mother's consent for research performed on live, nonviable fe-
tuses ex utero." In sum, although the right to determine whether the fetus
shall be used in research does not exist uniformly, it has certainly been
conferred in a substantial number of states.
Since Roe recognizes in all women the right to abort a pre-viable fetus,
the additional element necessary to establish a right to "disposition" of the
fetus may be found in those jurisdictions in which women also possess the
right to permit or to disallow research on the aborted fetus. In such juris-
dictions, women may be said to fulfill the criteria adopted in Moore for
establishing a property interest in their fetuses: They possess both the
right to use and enjoyment, as inferred from the lack of recourse against a
woman's prenatal abuse of her fetus, and the right of disposition derived
both from the holding in Roe v. Wade and from statutes conferring the
power of veto over subsequent uses of aborted fetuses. Thus, the prospect
that women may be able to receive consideration for their aborted fetuses,
whether through lump-sum payments or through royalty interests in de-
rivative products, is not remote in many jurisdictions and therefore de-
serves legislative attention.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING SALES OF FETAL
TISSUE
Allowing women to sell their fetal tissue directly, or to exercise their
right to share in profits resulting from commercial development of their
fetal tissue, would be contrary to public ethics and policy. The primary
ethical concern surrounding fetal tissue research has been the prospect of
encouraging abortions for profit. With respect to direct sales for lump-sum
Caplan):
It should also be obvious that those who seek fetal tissue must be held accountable for ob-
taining full and informed consent from donors. A California court recently held that John
Moore, a man who had had his spleen removed in order to treat his leukemia, has a property
interest in cells that were grown from his spleen. Women who undergo abortions have the
same right to information about what is to happen to fetal remains and to consent or not
consent to the use of tissues for transplantation or other medical purposes.
74. See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. I11.), appeal dismissed sub nora. Carey v.
Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), affd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding provision of statute prohib-
iting research on aborted fetuses as valid exercise of state's police power to regulate health-related
matters). But see Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 675 (E.D. La. 1984) (holding that Louisi-
ana lacked legitimate state interest in proscribing research on dead fetuses, and pointing out inconsis-
tency of statute which allowed, under Louisiana Anatomical Gift Act, donation by mother of body of
her child to medical science), afl'd sub nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Ohio, and Oklahoma do not permit nontherapeutic research on
dead fetuses if they are the product of a therapeutic abortion. Baron, supra note 44, at 14.
75. But see RESEARCH PANEL REPORT, supra note 27, at D151 (testimony of Robert J. Levine,
M.D.) ("[Tihe [Yale-New Haven Medical Center Institutional Review Board, which follows federal
regulations and guidelines regarding fetal experimentation,] considers maternal consent sufficient au-
thorization for the use for research purposes of the dead fetus, fetal material, or the placenta.").
76. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(d) (1988).
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consideration, the guarantee of compensation for the fetus would provide
an obvious incentive for women to undergo abortions. In the case where a
woman is offered a royalty interest in potential commercial developments
that utilize her fetal tissue, the realization of financial gain may be un-
likely; however, the patient's knowledge that a profit might nevertheless
accrue could encourage abortions in some borderline cases in which the
ultimate decision might hinge on the additional financial incentive. Public
policy as recently expressed through the NIH guidelines7  as well as in
regulations governing federally funded research unequivocally opposes in-
ducing women to conceive and abort for financial consideration. However,
despite strong public policy to the contrary, the possibility that abortions
for profit could occur nevertheless exists.
Even if no woman would deliberately abort her fetus for pecuniary
gain, and abortion decisions remained wholly independent of financial in-
ducements, the presence of market inducements might impinge upon the
secondary decision whether or not to contribute fetal tissue to medical re-
search. A commercial system of fetal tissue procurement might undermine
the sense of social responsibility that often motivates donations and
thereby diminish the availability of fetal tissue for research a.7  Although
public policy militates against the inducement of abortion to increase what
is perceived as a low supply of fetal tissue for transplantation and re-
search,'79 it is equally contrary to public policy to dissuade donations of
tissue once the abortion decision has been made. On a more philosophical
level, allowing women to profit from research on their fetuses might intro-
duce a sense of "commodification" into reproduction and pregnancy, and
at some level undermine human dignity. s
Although recent attempts have been made by Congress and NIH to
77. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN Bio-
TECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 96 (1987) ("NIH is
the primary source of funding for biomedical research undertaken at medical schools, graduate science
programs, and research hospitals ....").
78. Among the arguments against a market in body parts has been an expected decline in altru-
ism. See The Hastings Center, Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues Pertaining to Solid Organ Procure-
ment: A Report of the Project on Organ Transplation 2 (Oct. 1985) ("Altruism and a desire to benefit
other members of the community are important moral reasons which motivate many to donate. Any
perception . . . [by] the public that transplantation . . . is undertaken primarily with an eye toward
profit ...will severely imperil the moral foundations, and thus the efficacy, of the [donative] sys-
tem."); see also Manga, A Commercial Market for Organs? Why Not, in 1 BIOETHICS 321, 328 (H.
Kuhse & P. Singer eds. 1987) (study comparing voluntary and commercial systems of procuring blood
found voluntary systems more successful, demonstrating that "people can be highly motivated with a
sense of social responsibility towards the urgent health care needs of their community in a voluntary
system, and that promoting the selling of blood significantly reduced this sense of generosity and
concern.").
79. If, for example, abortion-inducing drugs such as RU 486, a drug recently developed in
France, become available in the United States, the availability of fetal tissue for research and trans-
plantation might decline dramatically.
80. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903-06 (1987) (monetization of
personal attributes undermines human identity); Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972)
(identifying moralisms as grounding for rules of inalienability).
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address these policy concerns, the extant laws have been narrowly drawn
and do not begin to address all of the potential commercial aspects of fetal
tissue research. Outside of those few states that explicitly prohibit all sales
of fetal tissue and fetal parts, the prospect of commercial transactions in-
fusing fetal tissue research remains very real."l
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
To achieve the policy goals of making fetal tissue available for medical
research and therapy while avoiding any inducement of abortion for
profit, this Note proposes the enactment of federal legislation prohibiting
the offer, solicitation, giving, or receiving of any consideration in any
transactions involving the transfer or procurement of fetal tissue. 2 This
legislation would apply not only to women having abortions but to any
other person involved in the transfer or procurement of fetal tissue. The
proposal would ensure that all acquisitions of fetal tissue by research in-
stitutions would occur strictly through donative transfers.
The legislation envisioned by this Note, moreover, would require that
all fetal tissue research in the United States be conducted in federally li-
censed and regulated nonprofit research institutions.8" In such establish-
ments, compensation would be paid to the research scientists for their ser-
vices, and additional revenues flowing from the development of
commercially valuable products would inure to the benefit of the nonprofit
institution.8 ' By eliminating any potential for profit from the transfer of
fetal tissue, the proposed legislation would help to prevent the exploitation
of abortion and would thereby benefit society by allowing critically impor-
tant medical research to continue while safeguarding public ethics and
policy.
81. Commercial transactions may arise not only as a result of profit-sharing from derivative prod-
ucts but also, in many states, from outright sales of fetal tissue by women-or resales by doctors or
hospitals-to companies conducting fetal tissue research. Commercial transactions in fetal tissue have
already been documented. See supra note 7.
82. Reasonable consideration would be allowed, however, for costs of delivery, storage, and re-
trieval of fetal tissue incurred in donative transfers.
83. It has already been suggested, in the context of federally funded research, that
the assurance section of the regulations-by which institutions interested in receiving federal
funds agree to abide by HHS guidelines-could be amended to place a condition on federal
funding providing that no employee of the institution may have a personal financial interest in
the research. The regulations also could be amended to require that any profit from the re-
search be deposited into the university's research accounts and applied for the benefit of per-
sons like the subject or to further research into the condition described in the research protocol.
Delgado & Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between
Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REv. 67, 126 (1986) (citations omitted). The
proposal advanced in this Note would essentially expand the safeguards delineated above to ensure
that the patient as well as the physicians, researchers, or any other party may not have any personal
financial interest in the research, and to regulate all fetal tissue research, whether funded federally or
otherwise.
84. The drafters of such legislation might, however, consider allowing joint ventures between fed-
erally licensed and regulated nonprofit institutions and for-profit firms in order to facilitate the
processing and marketing of eventual products such as vaccines and therapeutic drugs.
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V. CONCLUSION
Under existing law, courts in a substantial number of jurisdictions
could find that women have a right to profit from sales of their fetal tis-
sue. In light of the considerable demand for fetal tissue in medical re-
search and therapy, the existence of such a right might lead to abortions
for profit. Public policy clearly opposes abortions for profit, and it is es-
sential that laws are drawn to effectuate this policy. To prevent the devel-
opment of a commercial market in fetal tissue and the dangerous infusion
of commercial values into abortion decisions, federal legislation should be
enacted prohibiting all commerce in fetal tissue and mandating that fetal
tissue research be conducted exclusively on a not-for-profit basis by feder-
ally regulated research establishments.
